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Problem area 
Recent technological 
developments and increased 
utilization of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) have widened 
their application from military 
operations to also civil and 
commercial operations. UAS are 
most beneficial when they can 
share the whole airspace with 
manned aircraft. However, 
integration of UAS into non-
segregated airspace is only 
viable if UAS operations are 
proved to be safe enough. The 
concern is that UAS operations 
could pose a safety problem for 
other aircraft and persons or 
property on the ground. 
 
Description of work 
The objective of this paper is to 
develop and apply a safety risk 
analysis methodology for the 
risk of collision of an Unmanned 
Aircraft System with the ground. 
The method provides insight 
into the probability of a UAS 
collision with the ground in 
relation with safety objectives 
and requirements. To better 
understand the differences 
between manned and unmanned 
aircraft, UAS performance 
characteristics are examined. 
This helps to clarify in which 
airspace classes the different 
available UAS may be able to fly. 
This concerns the broad range 
of size, various configurations 
and different performance 
characteristics. Next, causal 
models are developed for 15 
accident scenario that may 
result in a collision with the 
ground. These causal models 
are represented as Event 
Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) and 
Fault Trees (FTs), and provide a 
logical structure showing how 
hazards and causal factors could 
combine to cause a collision 
with the ground. This approach 
utilizes the Causal model for Air 
Transport Safety (CATS) 
developed for the Dutch Ministry 
of Transport. Five specific UAS 
related ESDs are added to cover 
UAS specific hazards that do not 
exist in manned aircraft 
operation. Using the twenty 
ESDs, a UAS accident probability 
model for the risk of collision 
with the ground is developed. 
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Results and conclusions 
A safety risk analysis 
methodology for the risk of 
collision of an Unmanned 
Aircraft System with the ground 
has been developed. Causal 
models are developed for each 
accident scenario that may 
result in a collision with the 
ground. The method has been 
applied to derive Safety 
Objectives for hazardous events 
related to UAS operations in non 
segregated airspace, performed 
with UAS that are equivalent 
with manned aircraft in category 
Certification Specifications (CS) 
25. The Safety Objectives may 
be apportioned further (in a 
subsequent study) into Safety 
Requirements for each of the 
root causes, failures and causal 
factors underlying an accident 
scenario. The method provides 
insight into the probability of a 
UAS collision with the ground in 
relation with safety objectives. In 
third party risk analyses, usually 
Societal risk (to a group) and 
Individual risk (to individuals at 
a location) are evaluated. It is 
therefore recommended to 
further extend the developed 
method with an accident 
location model and an accident 
consequence model, in order to 
assess UAS third party risk in 
terms of these risk metrics. 
 
Applicability 
The developed methodology 
supports regulators with the 
setting of UAS safety objectives 
and safety requirements. It may 
also be used by applicants (UAS 
operators and manufacturers) 
for identification of UAS related 
hazards, causal factors, and 
accident scenarios. This paper 
illustrates the method for UAS 
operations performed with UAS 
that are equivalent with manned 
aircraft in category CS-25. For 
other types of UAS, it will be 
necessary to investigate if the 
ESDs developed in this paper 
still apply or whether or not 
further adaptations are required. 
It also remains to be 
investigated if the fact that a 
UAS does not carry passengers 
could allow for a less stringent 
Target Level of Safety than could 
apply for manned aviation.
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ABSTRACT 
Recent technological developments and increased utilization 
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have widened their 
application from military operations to also civil and 
commercial operations. UAS are most beneficial when they 
can share the whole airspace with manned aircraft. However, 
integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace is only viable 
if UAS operations are proved to be safe enough. The concern 
is that UAS operations could pose a safety problem for other 
aircraft and persons or property on the ground [19]. 
The objective of this paper is to develop and apply a safety 
risk analysis methodology for the risk of collision of an 
Unmanned Aircraft System with the ground. Such method 
could support regulators with the setting of UAS safety 
requirements. It may also be used by applicants (UAS 
operators and manufacturers) for identification of UAS related 
hazards, causal factors, and accident scenarios. The method 
provides insight into the probability of a UAS collision with 
the ground in relation with safety objectives and requirements. 
To better understand the differences between manned and 
unmanned aircraft, UAS performance characteristics are 
examined. This helps to clarify in which airspace classes the 
different available UAS may be able to fly. This concerns the 
broad range of size, various configurations and different 
performance characteristics (maximum takeoff weight, 
maximum flight altitude, endurance and maximum speed).  
Next, causal models are developed for each accident scenario 
that may result in a collision with the ground. These causal 
models are represented as Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) 
and Fault Trees (FTs), and provide a logical structure showing 
how hazards and causal factors could combine to cause a 
collision with the ground. This approach utilizes the Causal 
model for Air Transport Safety (CATS) developed for the 
Dutch Ministry of Transport [1]. Specific UAS related ESDs 
are added to cover UAS specific hazards that do not exist in 
manned aircraft operation [12]. Using the newly developed 
ESDs, a UAS accident probability model is developed for 
determination of the frequency of occurrence of a UAS 
accident in relation with safety objectives and requirements.  
In third party risk analyses, usually Societal risk (to a group) 
and Individual risk (to individuals at a location) are evaluated. 
It is recommended to extend the method with an accident 
location model and an accident consequence model, in order 
to assess UAS third party risk in terms of these risk metrics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The earliest area of usage of the unmanned aircraft systems is 
for military applications where these systems are used as 
expendable weapons or targets. Recent technological 
developments and increased utilization of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) have widened their application from military 
operations only to also civil and commercial operations. 
Research on UAS safety has been carried out with utilization 
of different approaches, focusing on the integration of UAS in 
non-segregated airspace [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. A 
problem area that has not yet been fully tackled – and to which 
this study will contribute to – is the derivation of a consistent 
set of safety objectives and safety requirements for the risk of 
collision of a UAS with the ground. One of the most 
significant challenges in the safety assessment of the ground 
collision risk of a UAS is the lack of past accident data. This 
creates a challenge, because it is to some extent uncertain 
which hazards and causes could lead to UAS accidents. A 
further challenge is the fact that regulations and standards for 
civil use of UAS are still under further development. 
Therefore, it is not yet possible to develop a very detailed 
concept of operation, and identification of the hazards and 
causes will – for the moment - have to stay at a relatively high 
level. Consequently, some general assumptions are to be made 
regarding the UAS itself and its operation. It is clear that it has 
to be shown that the current safety level does not decrease. 
The objective of this paper is to develop and apply a safety 
assessment methodology for the risk of collision of a UAS 
with the ground. The method support regulators and applicants 
in the process for approval and certification of civil UAS use. 
The next section introduces UAS and their performance 
characteristics. The paper continues with a description of the 
basic principles underlying the developed safety risk analysis 
methodology. This is followed by a description of the causal 
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models developed for each accident scenario that may result in 
a collision with the ground. Safety objectives and safety 
requirements are derived using a Target Level of Safety for 
the overall probability of ground collision. Finally, this paper 
provides conclusions, recommendations, and references.  
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
An Unmanned Aircraft Systems is defined by ICAO as “an 
aircraft and its associated elements which are operated with no 
pilot on board” [7]. In order for UAS to integrate into non-
segregated airspace and at non-segregated aerodromes, there 
shall be a pilot responsible for the UAS operation [7]. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that 
there is a remote pilot, situated at a remote pilot station (e.g. a 
Ground Control Station (GCS)). The Unmanned Aircraft itself 
is one component of the UAS, which also includes other 
components such as the GCS, payload, data link and data 
storage system and other supporting equipment. The GCS is 
the brain of the whole system from where the flight control 
orders are sent to the unmanned aircraft and where potential 
sensor data is analyzed. There can be more than one remote 
pilot in the GCS. A data link and data storage system is 
facilitated by a two way communication link, an uplink and a 
downlink, between the unmanned aircraft and the GCS.  
 
Considering UAS applications in the non-segregated airspace, 
the presence of various vehicle types, configurations and sizes 
should be recognized. The functional categories of UAS are 
derived from the past and current missions of these vehicles. 
In the light of past and present experience; one way to 
congregate the functional capabilities of UAS is through the 
following categories: Target and decoy, reconnaissance, 
combat, logistics, research and development and civil and 
commercial. Some UAS are capable to fulfill more than one 
functional capability while others are designed only to fulfill 
one specific mission. UAS can also be classified according to 
their size, range, and altitude. UVS International uses the 
following categories [8]: Nano, Micro, Mini, Close Range 
(CR), Short Range (SR), Medium Range (MR), Medium 
Range Endurance (MRE), Low Altitude Deep Penetration 
(LADP), Low Altitude Long Endurance (LALE), Medium 
Altitude Long Endurance (MALE), High Altitude Long 
Endurance (HALE), Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
(UCAV), Lethal (LETH), Decoy (DEC), Stratospheric 
(STRATO), Exo-stratospheric (EXO), Space (SPACE). Note 
that e.g. the Global Hawk and Euro Hawk fit in the HALE 
category, the Predator in the MALE category, the Sperwer in 
the MR category and the Geocopter GC-201 in category CR. 
Figure 1 shows maximum operating altitude versus Maximum 
Take-Off Weight (MTOW) characteristics of thirteen different 
types of UAS and their operating airspace classes [8, 9] on the 
right side. Nano, micro and mini UAS are operated in 
uncontrolled airspace and at a relatively low altitude. CR, SR, 
MR, DEC and LETH UAS may fly in the airspace classes B, 
C, D and E. Generally, their altitude range stands between 
3000m to 6300m. MALE type UAS mostly operate in airspace 
class A, while HALE types have the capability to operate 
above 18000 m in uncontrolled airspace. Although the HALE 
operating environment is uncontrolled airspace, they may have 
to pass the controlled airspaces (A, B, C, D and E) before 
reaching their operating altitude. Under these circumstances, 
these HALE UAS should also have the same safety 
considerations as the UAS which operate in the controlled 
airspace classes. 
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Figure 1 UAS flight altitude versus MTOW 
Figure 2 sketches the relation between endurance and MTOW 
of the thirteen different UAS categories [8]. Nano and micro 
unmanned aerial vehicles have very low endurance times that 
can be measured with minutes. One can observe the increasing 
trend of the maximum endurance capability as the mass of the 
unmanned aircraft increases. UAS have a very wide range of 
endurance capability. While nano, mini and micro UAVs can 
be operated not exceeding a couple of hours, a strategic UAV 
can operate up to 36 hours. 
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Figure 2 UAS endurance versus MTOW 
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Figure 3 shows the relationship between maximum speed and 
maximum altitude of different size classes of unmanned 
aircraft systems [8]. The maximum speed interval for various 
mini UAS vary between 220-250 km/h. CR, SR, MR, MRE 
and LALE type UAS do not have high velocity (changes 
between 120-350 km/h) compared to MALE and HALE. At 
the altitudes at which CR, SR, MR, MRE and LALE type of 
UAS fly, manned aircraft speeds can be reached. The cruise 
speed of MALE and HALE is significantly higher than that of 
other UAS. 
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Figure 3 UAS maximum speed versus maximum altitude 
 
SAFETY METHODOLOGY 
A generic process for the safety assessment of ATM systems 
usually deals with three subsequent questions [10]: 
 How safe does the system needs to be? 
 How safe can the system be? 
 How safe is the implemented system? 
 
Implementation and transfer to operations is not within the 
scope of this paper. Therefore, in this paper the focus will be 
on the establishment of a Target Level of Safety (TLS), the 
associated Safety Objectives (SOs) and Safety Requirements 
(SRs) for the risk of collision of a UAS with the ground. This 
may subsequently be used by manufacturers and operators as 
guidance for implementation and transfer to UAS operations. 
 
To determine how safe the system needs to be, Safety 
Objectives are specified on the basis of an overall TLS. A SO 
is a qualitative or quantitative statements that defines the 
maximum frequency or probability at which a hazard can be 
accepted to occur. To determine how safe the system can be, 
the SOs are apportioned into Safety Requirements for each of 
the hazards and causes underlying an event for which a SO is 
specified. Although the SRs may include organizational, 
operational, procedural, functional, performance, and 
interoperability requirements or environment characteristics, 
they are usually allocated to the system elements, i.e. specify 
the risk level to be achieved by the system elements. 
 
Our proposed method follows exactly the same process, but 
derives the TLS, SOs, and SRs for the collision risk of UAS 
with the ground from the existing Causal model for Air 
Transport Safety (CATS) [1], which was originally developed 
for commercial air transport operations. The proposed 
approach for the setting of UAS safety requirements uses 
Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) and Fault Trees (FTs), and 
is proposed to consist of the following sequential steps [12]: 
1. Define the scope of the UAS accident probability model, 
including type of operation, assumptions, limitations, etc. 
2. Identify relevant incident/accident and accident avoidance 
scenarios for UAS based on literature and safety studies. 
3. Select ESDs from CATS that are valid for UAS as well. 
4. Modify selected ESDs for UAS operations, if necessary. 
5. Develop ESDs for scenarios unique to UAS operations. 
6. Select, modify and/or develop Fault Trees for each of the 
events in the UAS related ESDs. 
7. Set a Target Level of Safety for the overall probability of 
occurrence of a UAS collision with the ground. 
8. Derive Safety Objectives for each of the end-events 
ground collision’ in all the ESDs developed for UAS. 
9. Derive Safety Requirements for each of the hazards and 
causes represented in the FTs. 
 
An advantage of this approach is that utilization of ESDs will 
visually demonstrate event series that lead to an accident. For 
the same reason, utilization of fault trees demonstrates cause 
and effect relationship of hazardous events. A generic ESD 
with FTs is given below. Each ESD consists of several events:  
• One initiating event; 
• Several end-events, which are the end state of a sequence 
of events, and; 
• One or more pivotal events (failures of so-called 
‘barriers’) with fault trees. 
 
 
Figure 4 Generic ESD with fault trees 
In this paper, the initiating event is defined as the first event of 
the accident scenario which commences the series of events 
leading to collision with ground. Accident scenarios end up 
with collision with ground end events and accident avoidance 
scenarios end up with no ground collision end events.  
 
The total probability of collision of a UAS with the ground is 
equal to the sum of the collision with ground probabilities of 
each accident scenario, which should be smaller than the TLS.  
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In this paper, the safety objectives pertain to the initiating and 
pivotal events of the event sequence diagrams and represent 
the maximum allowed probability that is necessary to be met 
by the safety requirements. Determined Safety Requirements 
relate to various components of unmanned aircraft systems 
and they represent the maximum failure frequency that UAS 
components are allowed to have in order to assure that the risk 
of a collision with the ground does not exceed a defined TLS. 
GROUND IMPACT RISK ANALYSIS 
In this paper, ground impact risk represents the risk of a UAS 
collision with the ground. This type of risk includes UAS 
collision with earth, sea or other obstacles. A possible ground 
collision might cause damage to the aircraft, damage to the 
obstacles, injuries and/or fatalities. Ground impact risk 
analysis is performed via causal models which are developed 
for each accident scenario that may result in a collision with 
the ground. 
 
Some assumptions have been adopted in the qualitative 
development phase of the Event Sequence Diagrams to 
maintain the general applicability of the developed 
methodology to a wide range of UAS. These assumptions are 
considered necessary as they constrain the complexity of the 
system or because of the limited information on available 
and/or currently used systems in unmanned aviation. The 
following general assumptions have been made: 
 The UAS is to a large extent equivalent with manned 
aircraft in category Certification Specifications (CS)-25. 
 The UAS comprises one Ground Control Station (GCS) 
and at least one remote pilot who are located at the GCS. 
 The following communications links are available:  
o Air-ground link between the GCS and the aerial 
vehicle for command and control;  
o Air-ground link between ATC and the aerial vehicle 
for traffic surveillance;  
o Communication link(s) between the UAS remote 
pilots and ATC. 
 The UAS flight may cross multiple ATC control sectors. 
 The UAS may carry different payloads, but is not used to 
transport passengers. 
 Both night and day UAS operations are considered. 
 The UAS uses runways for take off and approach/landing. 
 The UAS comprises a single engine and fixed wing. 
 The UAS has fire detection, warning and extinguishing 
systems onboard. 
 The UAS is able to fly in icing conditions. 
 The UAS is used for civil and commercial IFR operations. 
 
In addition to the above, 3 modelling assumptions are made: 
 There are no dependencies between the different ESDs. 
 Pivotal events cannot occur ‘partially’; these events are 
described as either happening (yes) or not happening (no). 
 
ACCIDENT SCENARIOS 
Aviation accidents tend to result from a combination of many 
different causal factors (human errors, technical failures, 
environmental and management influences) in certain 
characteristic accident categories (loss of control, collision, 
fire etc), whose causes and consequences differ according to 
the phase of flight in which they occur (taxi, take-off, en-route 
etc). The CATS project approached this complexity by 
developing 33 separate causal models for each accident 
category in commercial air transport [7]. A review of the 
original 33 CATS scenarios has yielded fifteen relevant ESDs 
applicable to UAS operations. The ESDs which do not have a 
“collision with ground” end event are eliminated for the scope 
of this research. Five further UAS specific ESDs can be added 
to cover UAS specific hazards that do not exist in manned 
aircraft operation. The result is provided in Table 1. Note that 
the total collision with ground probability of the whole system 
is equal to the sum of the collision with ground probabilities of 
each accident scenario. 
Table 1 UAS hazards that might result in a ground collision 
# Name of the Event Sequence Diagrams 
5 Operation of UAS by remote pilot inappropriate 
6 UAS takes off with contaminated wing 
7 Weight and balance outside limits (takeoff) 
8 UAS encounters performance decreasing windshear   
11 Fire on board UAS 
12 Remote pilot spatially disorientated 
13 Flight control system failure 
14 Remote pilot(s) incapacitation 
15 Anti-ice system not operating 
16 Flight instrument failure 
17 UAS encounters adverse weather 
18 UAS engine failure 
19 Unstable approach 
21 Weight and balance outside limits (approach/landing) 
37 Wake vortex encounter 
40 UAS Positional information system failure 
41 UAS Data link failure 
42 Unnatural conditions in UAS Ground Control Station 
43 UAS Mid air collision 
44 A part of the UAS falls down 
 
Assuming that the future UAS operation will have to be at 
least as safe as commercial air transport in the current manned 
aviation system [11], it is possible to derive SOs for each ESD 
using the quantified CATS [1]. The collision with the ground 
end event’s SOs, are used as the starting point to calculate SOs 
for the pivotal events, other end events and the initiating event 
in the event sequence diagram. Figures 5 to 24 demonstrate 
the ESDs with their safety objectives located at the top of the 
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event boxes. The SOs for the end-event “ground collision” of 
the ESDs are indicated with red color. The pivotal events’ SOs 
that are determined via assumptions, are indicated with a blue 
color. A conservative approach is followed when making 
assumptions for the SO of pivotal events which are dependent 
on the behavior of the remote pilot(s). The human error 
probability of remote pilot depends on many factors, including 
the skill level, training, and performance of critical tasks. 
When it is highly likely that a remote pilot will fail to regain 
control of the aircraft after a certain sequence of events, it is 
assumed he will. Hence, a failure probability of 1 is then used. 
It is furthermore assumed that practicable safety requirements 
for a remote pilot may not be more stringent than in the order 
of about 10-3 probability of failure per flight. Practicable safety 
requirements for system failures may be as stringent as about 
10-7 failure probability per flight. Therefore, when making 
assumptions, the SOs of the pivotal events that are dependent 
on human behavior are set to the lesser stringent values, while 
the SOs for pivotal events that are related to system failures 
are set to be more stringent. This way of balancing the SOs is 
expected to result in a realistic set of safety objectives and 
safety requirements, with the highest likelihood that all 
requirements are practicable and achievable.  
A total of 23 accident and 34 accident avoidance scenarios are 
represented by these 20 ESDs. Accident scenarios end up with 
‘collision with ground’ end events and accident avoidance 
scenarios end up with ‘no ground collision’ end events. Note 
that the latter may, besides nonhazardous consequences such 
as ‘UAS continues flight’ or ‘UAS continues landing roll’, 
also contain hazardous consequences that are not in the scope 
of an end event ‘UAS ground collision’ (e.g. aircraft continues 
flight damaged). These ESDs are visualised in 20 Figures, and 
explained in the following pages. Note that Safety Objectives 
are determined for each of the events in the ESDs. The overall 
Target Level of Safety is equal to the sum of the SOs of the 
end-events “ground collision” of all the different ESDs. 
The initiating event of ESD 5 occurs as a result of remote 
pilots’ takeoff commencing while the UAS is not properly 
configured for takeoff. The following pivotal and end events 
are represented in Figure 5 respectively. Take-off 
configuration warning is regarded as a determinative event 
because of an unsuccessful one causes a ground collision. 
 
The initiating event of ESD 6 occurs as a result of remote 
pilots’ takeoff commencing while aircraft wing, horizontal 
stabilizer, tail and/or flight control surfaces are contaminated 
with frost, ice, slush or snow. The following series of events in 
the scenario are represented in order in Figure 6.  
 
The initiating event of ESD 7 describes the situation where the 
centre of gravity or weight of UAS differs from the remote 
pilots’ expectations such that remote pilots have to take 
additional action to maintain control of the aircraft. This ESD 
only applies to takeoff. Figure 7 shows the subsequent events 
in the scenario.  
 
 
Figure 5 Operation by remote pilot(s) inappropriate  
 
 
Figure 6 UAS takes off with contaminated wing 
 
Figure 7 Weight/balance outside limits (takeoff) 
Figure 8 describes the situation where the UAS encounters an 
increase in tailwind or a decrease in headwind after rotation. 
The occurrence probability of a performance decreasing 
windshear is determined based on the probability data but 
occurrence due to wake vortex is excluded. 
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Figure 8 Encountering performance decreasing windshear 
The initiating event in ESD 11 describes the situation where a 
combustible substance onboard the UAS is burning (see Fig. 
9). It is assumed that the UAS has fire detection and/or fire 
warning system which warns remote pilots who are located at 
the GCS and also a fire extinguishing system installed onboard 
that can be controlled and activated by GCS. 
 
Figure 9 Fire on board UAS 
The initiating event of ESD 12 refers to the situation where 
remote pilots are spatially disoriented owing to unsuccessful 
attitude guidance and lack of visual orientation following by 
lack of autopilot control. According to Figure 10 after remote 
pilots are spatially disoriented, the type of the end event 
depends on the success of remote pilots to maintain control.  
The initiating event of ESD 13 describes the situation where a 
flight control system failure occurs. Once there is a flight 
control system failure, type of the end event generally depends 
on the remote pilots’ success to maintain control (see Fig. 11). 
 
Figure 10 Remote pilots spatially disoriented 
 
Figure 11 Flight control system failure 
The initiating event of ESD 14 describes the situation where 
any required remote pilot is unable to perform the prescribed 
flight duties as a result of reduced medical fitness (medical 
illness or injuries). Once the remote pilots fail to maintain 
control due to incapacitation, the type of the end event 
depends on the success or failure of the auto recovery module 
to maintain control (see Fig. 12).  
 
Figure 12 Remote pilot(s) incapacitation 
The initiating event of ESD 15 describes the situation where 
UAS’ anti ice system does not operate while it flies in severe 
icing conditions that might exceed the UAS’ certification 
envelope and cause ice accretion on the outside structure of 
UAS. Icing of the pitot static system is not covered in this 
ESD. The following series of events in the scenario are 
represented in order in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 Anti icing system not operating 
The initiating event of ESD 16 describes the situation where 
any flight instrument fails to display flight data, i.e. airspeed, 
altitude and/or attitude. According to Figure 14, after a flight 
instrument failure occurs, the type of the end event depends on 
the success of the remote pilots to maintain control. 
 
Figure 14 Flight instrument failure 
The initiating event in ESD 17 describes the situation where 
UAS encounters with severe turbulence or unfavourable 
weather conditions which may result in structure overstress. 
The following events of the scenario are represented in Figure 
15 with their consequences. 
 
Figure 15 UAS encounters adverse weather 
The initiating event in ESD 18 describes the situation of a 
significant thrust loss from the propulsion system. For the 
purpose of this ESD, only engine failures during climb, en-
route or approach phases are considered and engine 
detachment cases are included. Engine fires are excluded due 
to their previous incorporation in ESD 11. Following series of 
events in the scenario are represented in order in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Single engine failure 
Figure 17 shows ESD 19. The initiating event in ESD 19 
describes the situation where one or more of the flight 
parameters are set out incorrectly by the remote pilots that 
result in an unstable approach. Initiation and execution of a 
missed approach is done to achieve a flight in safe conditions 
in a safe state. 
 
Figure 17 Unstable approach 
The initiating event of ESD 21 describes the situation where 
the centre of gravity or weight of UAS differs from the remote 
pilots’ expectations such that remote pilots have to take 
additional action to maintain control of the aircraft. This ESD 
only applies to the approach and landing phase. Figure 18 
shows the subsequent events in the scenario. 
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Figure 18 Weight/balance outside limit (approach/landing) 
The initiating event of ESD 18 describes the situation where 
UAS encounters the wake vortex of a preceding aircraft such 
that noticeable deviations from the UAS’ initially intended 
flight path or attitude occur. Figure 19 shows the following 
events in the scenario. 
 
Figure 19 Wake vortex encounter 
Figure 20 shows ESD 40. The initiating event describes the 
situation where the actual location of UAS differs from the 
location displayed in the GCS due to a failure in the positional 
information system of UAS. The pivotal event “remote pilots’ 
loss of situational awareness” is defined as the situation where 
remote pilots’ mental picture of UAS’ position in the 
horizontal or vertical plane does not correspond with the 
actual position. 
 
Figure 20 UAS positional information system failure 
The initiating event of ESD 41 describes the situation where 
there is a failure in the Air Data Terminal (ADT) and/or 
Ground Data Terminal (GDT), which subsequently leads to 
the loss of data link implying that the remote pilot(s) cannot 
communicate with the aircraft. Following series of events in 
the scenario are represented in order in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 UAS data link failure 
The initiating event of ESD 42 describes the situation where 
GCS encounters severe conditions such as fire and/or weather 
related disasters, i.e. flood, thunderstorms unexpectedly. 
Figure 22 represents the following series of events in the 
scenario. 
 
Figure 22 Unnatural conditions in the UAS GCS 
The initiating event of ESD 43 represents a mid air collision 
where the flight trajectory of a UAS intersects with the flight 
trajectory of a manned aircraft. The pivotal event “parts of the 
aircrafts fall down” is defined as the situation where UAS 
manages to continue flight after a mid air collision but the 
collision causes detachment of some aircraft parts which lead 
to a ground collision when they fall down (see Fig. 23). 
The accident scenario of ESD 44 is represented in Figure 24 
and it only deals with the situation where a part of UAS falls 
down while it is flying due to maintenance and/or design 
failure, maneuver outside the flight envelope, severe 
turbulence conditions or cargo fall. 
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Figure 23 UAS mid air collision 
 
Figure 24 A part of the UAS falls down 
SAFETY OBJECTIVES 
The SO calculations are initiated with the presence of a TLS. 
Calculations are carried out from the right side of each ESD to 
the left side (starting from the end events). A SO is obtained 
for all of the initiating and pivotal events that might lead to a 
ground collision, using the assumption that the future UAS 
operation will have to be at least as safe as commercial air 
transport in the current manned aviation system. The Safety 
Objectives, which are represented by the initiating and pivotal 
events of the ESDs, are determined and summarized in Table 
2. Since some events are repeated several times with different 
SOs in different ESDs (i.e. remote pilots fail to maintain 
control) their most stringent SO values are listed only. 
Table 2 List of the UAS safety objectives 
NAME SO 
Incorrect configuration (per takeoff) 9×10-7 
Take Off Configuration Warning (TOCW) 
(per takeoff with incorrect configuration) 9×10-1 
UAS stalls after rotation (per takeoff 
continuation with TOCW failure) 1×100 
Remote pilot(s) fail to regain control (per 
stall after takeoff continuation with TOCW 
failure) 1×100 
UAS takes off with contaminated wing (per 
takeoff) 7×10-7 
UAS stalls after rotation (per takeoff with ice 
on wings) 1×10-2 
Remote pilot(s) fail to regain control (per 
takeoff with ice on wings) 1×100 
UAS weight and balance outside limits (per 
takeoff) 1×10-6 
UAS stalls after rotation (per takeoff outside 
the limits) 1×10-3 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
stall after takeoff outside limits) 1×10-3 
UAS encounters a performance decreasing 
windshear after rotation (per takeoff) 1×10
-5
 
Remote pilot(s) fail to detect wind shear (per 
takeoff with windshear encounter) 1×10-4 
Remote pilot(s) fail to perform windshear 
escape maneuver (per windshear detection) 6×10
-2
 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
windshear detection &/ avoidance failure) 1×100 
Fire on board UAS (per flight) 5×10-5 
Remote pilot(s) fail to detect smoke/fire (per 
fire onboard) 1×10-2 
Remote pilot(s) fail to extinguish fire (per 
fire onboard) 1×10-2 
Fire propagates (per developed fire onboard) 1×10-2 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
propagated fire on board) 1×100 
Remote pilot spatially disoriented (per flight) 6×10-8 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
spatial disorientation) 3×10-1 
Flight control system failure (per flight) 2×10-5 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
system control failure) 9×10-4 
Remote pilot(s) incapacitation (per flight) 7×10-4 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
incapacitation) 1×10-3 
Auto recovery module fails (per flight) 1×10-2 
Ice accretion on UAS (per flight) 4×10-6 
Remote pilot(s) fail to respond (per ice 
accretion) 3×10-3 
Flight instrument failure (per flight) 4×10-6 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
instrument failure) 2×10-3 
UAS encounters adverse weather (per flight) 3×10-7 
Ultimate design load exceeded (per adverse 
weather conditions) 2×10-3 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
adverse weather conditions) 6×10-3 
Single engine failure (per flight) 7×10-7 
Remote pilot(s) fail to restart the engine (per 
single engine failure) 1×100 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
total power loss) 2×10-1 
Unstable approach (per landing) 4×10-4 
Remote pilot(s) fail to initiate and execute 
missed approach (per unstable approach) 1×10
-1
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Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
failure to execute missed approach) 2×10-3 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
missed approach) 9×10-5 
UAS weight and balance outside limits (per 
approach) 1×10-6 
Remote pilot(s) fail to regain control (per 
approach with weight and balance problem)  2×10-3 
Wake vortex encounter (per flight) 9×10-5 
Remote pilot(s) fail to maintain control (per 
wake encounter) 5×10-5 
Positional information system failure (per 
flight) 3×10-3 
Remote pilot(s) loss of situational awareness 
(per flight) 1×10-3 
Loss of data link (per flight) 3×10-6 
Remote pilot(s) fail to resolve the problem 
(per flight) 1×100 
Unnatural conditions in the GCS (per flight) 3×10-6 
The problem is failed to be resolved (per 
flight) 1×100 
UAS Mid air collision (per flight) 3×10-8 
UAS fails to continue flight (per flight) 1×100 
Parts of the UAS falls down (per flight) 1×100 
A part of UAS falls down (per flight) 3×10-8 
 
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
Safety requirements are determined via the utilization of fault 
trees that are generated under the initiating and pivotal events. 
A fault tree structure has one top gate at the top and several 
root causes at the bottom. The top gate of a fault tree is either 
the pivotal event or the initiating event of an ESD. The root 
causes are usually human related, system related or task 
related. In the scope of this research, the failure frequency of a 
root cause in a fault tree represents the safety requirement 
which is defined as the maximum allowable failure frequency 
that a specific system, task or human act needs to have. 
Human related safety requirements usually pertain to 
erroneous operator acts or the remote pilot incapability and 
restrict them to a certain failure rate per certain flight hours. 
Human related safety requirements are usually less stringent 
than system related safety requirements. The latter are usually 
related to system incapacities, failures or system shutdowns. 
Task related safety requirements mostly relate to erroneous, 
unperformed or insufficient task-based acts, which may 
include the contribution of an operator and/or a system. 
Determination of the SRs can be considered beneficial for 
manufacturers and rule making authorities. SRs are “serving 
tools” for the manufacturers since they represent the 
maximum allowable failure frequency that a specific system 
needs to have. A relatively high value of SRs stands for a less 
restrictive safety standard and a small value of SRs stands for 
a relatively more restrictive safety standard. Under the 
circumstances where there is lack of regulations, SRs 
establishment would also provide insight to the rule making 
authorities via demonstrating which kind of tasks and/or 
systems have a high failure frequency under the predefined 
conditions. Lastly, SRs may determine the kind and level of 
training that a UAS remote pilot needs to receive. 
An example of how to interfere Safety Requirements for root 
causes is provided in Figure 25 and Table 3 below. The 
example reflects the root causes for pivotal event ‘UAS weight 
and balance outside limits (take off)’. It is outside scope of 
this paper to include all FTs (note that reference 12 does 
provide the full details on the derivation of about 140 SRs). 
 
Figure 25 Example fault tree “auto recovery module fails” 
Table 3 Example Safety Requirements for root causes 
Root causes SRs 
Auto recovery is not capable of required action 
(per flight) 1.67×10-3 
Auto recovery is not in use at the time (per 
flight) 1.67×10-3 
Auto recovery is incorrectly used (per flight) 1.67×10-3 
Auto recovery system failure (per flight) 5.00×10-3 
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RISK MITIGATION MEASURES 
Some of the Safety Objectives derived in this research are 
relatively stringent. It is therefore relevant to identify some 
mitigation measures that could help to reduce or cope with the 
root causes of UAS hazards and risks. Utilization of control 
system redundancy management can mitigate the risk of flight 
control system failures, and make it easier to demonstrate that 
the associated SOs will be met. Additionally, utilization of 
caution and warning indicators may help to eliminate certain 
hazards or identify risks in an early stage. An example of the 
utilization of caution and warning indicators has already been 
used in the ESD ‘Fire onboard UAS’ by assuming presence of 
fire detection, warning and extinguishing systems onboard. 
Another important risk mitigation measure could be setting of 
waypoints which can help prevent or delay potential remote 
pilots’ spatial disorientation problems [13] and/or their loss of 
situational awareness during the flight. Other risk mitigation 
measures could be route changes, safe location of GCS and 
multiple flight planning. Route changes would help prevent 
the unfavorable operational weather conditions such as 
lightening, rain, wind speed aloft and turbulence level. 
Locating the GCS at a safe place i.e. a location where the 
earthquake frequency and severity is low enough, could help 
to cope with the effects of unexpected conditions and/or 
natural disasters happening at the location of GCS. Multiple 
flight planning could be another risk mitigation measurement 
which would affect the ESDs ‘Unstable Approach’, ‘UAS 
Engine Failure’, and ‘Remote Pilots Spatially Disoriented’. 
Evaluation of the impact of the above risk mitigations on the 
risk of a ground collision would be a topic for further study.  
 
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS 
Although UAS are mainly used in segregated airspace, the 
integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace is coming 
closer. To better understand the differences between manned 
and unmanned aircraft, UAS performance characteristics are 
examined. This helps to clarify in which airspace classes the 
different available UAS may be able to fly. This concerns the 
broad range of size, various configurations and different 
performance characteristics (maximum takeoff weight, 
maximum flight altitude, endurance and maximum speed).  
A safety risk analysis methodology for the risk of collision of 
an Unmanned Aircraft System with the ground has been 
developed. Causal models are developed for each accident 
scenario that may result in a collision with the ground. These 
causal models provide a logical structure, showing how 
hazards and causal factors could combine to cause a collision 
with the ground. This approach utilizes the CATS developed 
for the Dutch Ministry of Transport [1]. The method has been 
applied to derive Safety Objectives for hazardous events that 
may lead to a collision with the ground, under the assumption 
that the level of safety should be equivalent to that of current 
commercial air traffic operations. The method has been 
applied to derive Safety Objectives for hazardous events 
related to commercial UAS operations, performed with a UAS 
that is equivalent with manned aircraft in category CS-25. The 
Safety Objectives may be apportioned further (in a subsequent 
study) into Safety Requirements for each of the root causes, 
failures and causal factors underlying an accident scenario. 
The method provides insight into the probability of a UAS 
collision with the ground in relation with safety objectives. 
The developed methodology supports regulators with the 
setting of UAS safety objectives and safety requirements. It 
may also be used by applicants (UAS operators and 
manufacturers) for identification of UAS related hazards, 
causal factors, and accident scenarios. This paper illustrates 
the method for commercial UAS operations performed with 
UAS that are to a large extent equivalent with manned aircraft 
in category CS-25. For other UAS types, it will be necessary 
to investigate if the ESDs developed in this paper still apply or 
whether further adaptations are required. It also remains to be 
investigated if the fact that a UAS does not carry passengers 
could allow for a less stringent TLS than for manned aviation. 
In third party risk analyses, usually Societal risk (to a group) 
and Individual risk (to individuals at a location) are evaluated. 
It is recommended to extend the method with an accident 
location model and an accident consequence model, in order 
to assess UAS third party risk in terms of these risk metrics. 
 
REFERENCES 
1. B. Ale, L.J. Bellamy, R.M. Cooke, M. Duyvis, D. 
Kurowicka, P.H. Lin, O. Morales, A. Roelen, J. Spouge; 
Causal model for air transport safety - Final Report, 2009. 
2. Kuchar, J., Safety Analysis Methodology for Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Collision Avoidance Systems, 6th 
USA / Europe Seminar on Air Traffic Management 
Research and Development, Baltimore, MD, 2005.  
3. Clothier, R, Walker, R, Fulton, N, Campbell, D. A 
Casualty Risk Analysis For Unmanned Aerial System 
(UAS) Operations Over Inhabited Areas, AIAC12 – 
Twelfth Australian International Aerospace Congress,2nd 
Australasian Unmanned Air Vehicles Conference, 19 – 22 
March 2007. 
4. Luxhøj, J. Safety Risk Analysis of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace 
System (NAS): Phase 1 Final Report, Department of 
Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration, 2008. 
5. Oztekin, A, and Luxhøj, J. Hazard, Safety, Risk and 
Uncertainity Modeling of the Integration of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace, 26th 
International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences 
(ICAS) 2008.  
6. Clothier, R, and Walker, R. Determination and evaluation 
of UAV safety objectives, Proceedings of 21st 
International Unmanned Air Vehicle Conference, Bristol, 
United Kingdom, pp. 18.1-18.16., 2006. 
  
 
 
 
 
16 NLR-TP-2011-325 August 2011   
 
Page 12 of 12 
 
7. ICAO; Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Circular 328-
AN/190, ISBN 978-92-9231-751-5. 
8. UVS International; Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Yearbook, 8th Edition, 2010/2011 
9. FAA Airspace Classifications, Chapter 8, the National 
Airspace System.  
10. EUROCONTROL; Safety Assessment Methodology, 
Version 2.1, November 2006. 
11. UAV Task-Force Final Report, A Concept For European 
Regulations For Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), The Joint JAA/EUROCONTROL Initiative on 
UAVs, 11 May 2004. 
12. A.D. Ozuncer; Development of a Safety Assessment 
Methodology for the Risk of Collision of a Unmanned 
Aircraft System with the Ground, MSc thesis, 2011. 
13. Benson, A.J.; Spatial disorientation – a perspective, in 
RTO HFM Symposium on Spatial Disorientation in 
Military Vehicles: Causes, Consequences and Cures, La 
Coruna, Spain, 15-17 April 2002, RTO-MP-086. 
14. R.E. Weibel, R.J. Hansman; Safety considerations for 
operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the National 
Airspace System, Report No. ICAT-2005-1, March 2005. 
15. EUROCONTROL; Unmanned Aircraft Systems - ATM 
Collision Avoidance Requirements (Phase 1), Edition 1.2, 
14 December 2009, CND/CoE/CNS/09-156. 
16. EUROCONTROL; Specifications for the Use of military 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Operational Air Traffic 
outside segregated Airspace, 2007. 
17. H. de Jong (DFS), R. Priego Lopez (ISDEFE), Scope of 
risks and safety criteria, INOUI D5.0b, 27 March 2009. 
18. D. Durrett, H. de Jong (DFS), J. Tattersall (Rheinmetall); 
Functional Hazard Analysis, INOUI D5.2, 29 June 2009. 
19. L.J.P. Speijker, X. Lee, R. van de Leijgraaf; Framework 
for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk 
Management, NLR-TP-2011-324, August 2011. 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
The author may be contacted at aysedenizozuncer@gmail.com 
and/or Valckenierstraat 39, 1018 XE Amsterdam, Netherlands.  
The co-authors may be contacted as follows:  
     L.J.P. (Lennaert) Speijker, NLR, Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 
1059 CM, Amsterdam, Netherlands, speijker@nlr-atsi.nl 
     J.A.A.M. (John) Stoop, TU Delft, Kluyverweg 1, 2629 HS 
Delft, Netherlands, J.A.A.M.Stoop@tudelft.nl 
     R. (Ricky) Curran, TU Delft, Kluyverweg 1, 2629 HS 
Delft, Netherlands, R.Curran@tudelft.nl 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The authors would like to thank colleagues at the NLR Air 
Transport Safety Institute for their support and feedback. In 
particular, we are grateful to the constructive comments of 
both Joram Verstraeten and Alfred Roelen throughout the 
whole duration of the work (August 2010 until May 2011). 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ADT Air Data Terminal 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
CATS Causal model for Air Transport Safety 
CR Close Range 
CS Certification Specifications 
DEC Decoy 
ESD Event Sequence Diagram 
EXO Exo-stratospheric 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GCS Ground control station 
GDT Ground Data Terminal 
HALE High altitude long endurance 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
LADP Low altitude deep penetration 
LALE Low altitude long endurance 
LETH Lethal 
MALE Medium altitude long endurance 
MR Medium range 
MRE Medium range endurance 
MTOW Maximum take-off weight 
SO Safety Objective 
SPACE Space 
SR Short range 
SRs Safety requirements 
STRATO Stratospheric 
TLS Target level of safety 
TOCW Take Off Configuration Warning 
UAS Unmanned aircraft systems 
UCAV Unmanned combat aerial vehicle 
 
